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Joseph  T. Mahoney
An empirical approach combining elements of principal-agent theory  and transaction
cost  economics  is  used to  determine  farmers'  preferences  for contract  terms in crop
production.  The  approach  is  tested by asking grain  farmers  to rank contract  choices
and  specify  price premiums  in simulated  case  situations.  The statistical results  indi-
cate that farmers'  preferences  for rates of cost sharing, price premiums, and financing
arrangements  are  significantly  influenced by asset  specialization  and uncertainty  as-
sociated  with the case  situations,  and  by selected business  and personal  characteris-
tics.
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Introduction
Contract production and vertical integration are common  with livestock, broilers, turkeys,
fruits, vegetables,  and dairy  in the U.S.,  but vertical  coordination  in  grain production  is
limited  (Barkema,  Drabenstott,  and  Welch;  Barry,  Sonka,  and  Lajili;  Sporleder).  The
most  common  form  of  vertical  coordination  in  grain  is  forward  contracting  of prices
(Hambleton  and Bullen).  Grain farmers  in the U.S. formerly  "contracted"  with the fed-
eral government in order to participate  in price and income support programs  along with
related acreage  set-aside requirements.  The decoupling  between price protection and pro-
duction reflected in the 1996 farm bill, along with increasing processor interest in specific
input  characteristics,  will  likely  lead  to  more  extensive  vertical  coordination  in  crop
production (Coaldrake  and Sonka  1995).
Some of the new contracting  alternatives  may require  farmers to invest in specialized
equipment.  This  increase  in  the  complexity  of decision  making  suggests  the  need  for
new information about the effects of transaction and producer characteristics  on preferred
contract terms  and financing  arrangements.  Principal-agent  theory,  transaction  cost  eco-
nomics,  and  game  theory  provide  (individually  or  combined)  sound  theoretical  frame-
works  for addressing  contractual  and vertical  coordination  decisions.  In particular,  prin-
cipal-agent  theory  (Jensen  and  Meckling)  and transaction  cost economics  (Williamson)
suggest  that  an  asset's  degree  of specialization  (asset  specificity)  and  uncertainty  may
strongly  influence  vertical  coordination  decisions  (Mahoney),  although  little is  known
about  their  influence  on  crop  contracts  (Frank  and  Henderson).  Both  contractors  and
farmers must consider the risk-return  trade-offs of each potential crop contract. Farmers'
choices may  also depend on their risk attitudes and financial positions.  Thus, contractors
and  farmers  have  both  expressed  the  need  for  new  information  to  assist  in  contract
evaluation  and decision making  (Coaldrake  and  Sonka  1993).
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This  article  uses  a principal-agent  and  transaction  cost approach  to  specify  the  risk
and decision elements  of new contract choices in crop production and tests the approach
based on rankings  by  grain farmers  of contract  choices  that differ  in terms  of required
investments  in specialized  assets,  riskiness  of returns,  and  farmer/contractor  sharing  ar-
rangements  for production  and  financial  costs.  Historic  data cannot be  used to  analyze
new contracts which have not previously  been offered.  Therefore, this analysis generates
the  needed  data  by  surveying  farmers  about  their  preferred  contract  choices  in  case
decision  situations.  Doing  so is  consistent  with Williamson's  (p.  27)  recognition of the
need to  " ..  develop primary,  micro-analytic  data"  for this purpose.  The grain farmers
reside in Central Illinois,  although the approach  and findings  will apply to a much wider
range of crop producers.
Model  Development
Transaction  cost and principal-agent  concepts  will be jointly used to develop hypotheses
about the  anticipated  effects  of asset  specificity,  uncertainty,  and  firm characteristics  on
vertical  coordination  and  financing  decisions  by  crop producers.'  Asset  specificity  rep-
resents the degree to which an investment's assets are specialized to particular uses. More
specialized  assets are less easily liquidated or adapted to other uses. As shown by Riordan
and  Williamson,  highly  specialized  assets  can  create  potential  hold-up  problems  and
opportunistic  pursuit of quasi-rents  by the contracting  parties.2 Uncertainty  includes the
range  of possible  production  levels  and  prices,  and  unanticipated  behavioral  responses
by the contracting parties-called bounded rationality  and opportunistic  behavior by Wil-
liamson.  Financing  arrangements  also  are  important,  based on Williamson's  contention
that highly  specific  assets  will have  greater  equity  financing,  while  less  specific  assets
involve  greater debt  financing.
The crop contracting  relationship  can be modeled  as  a principal-agent problem where
the  agent  (farmer)  is growing  a  specialty  crop that  will be  owned and  exclusively used
by the principal  (processor).  Asymmetric information reflects the processor's uncertainty
about  the farmer's efforts  and performance  under the contract.  The  "real"  ex post con-
tract  costs  are private  information to  the farmer who  can truthfully  disclose them to the
principal  or not.  The processor  cannot  completely  observe  the  managerial  effort  spent
by  the  farmer  on  the  contracted  activity  and  the  care  taken  to  reach  the  desired  crop
quality.  He  also  cannot observe consistently  whether the  specific  asset was used  appro-
priately  and  exclusively  to  the contract  (i.e.,  moral hazard  problems).  Monitoring  costs
are assumed  to be  relatively high  and  quality measurement  techniques  are either costly
or  imperfect.  As  a  result,  the  contract  terms  should  be  set  so  that  the  incentives  and
efficiency  considerations  are  consistent with  the risk-bearing  capacities  of the  agent.
The  effects  of these  factors  on contract choice,  along  with the  farmer's personal  and
' A game theory approach  is also appropriate for modeling contract design and negotiation questions (e.g., Tirole). However,
such  an  approach  is  more  valid  when  the  parties  have  equal  or  close  bargaining  power  and the  contract  terms  are  set
competitively  through repeated negotiations  and/or bargaining.  Crop contracting  farmers usually have  contract opportunities
with  only a few large agribusinesses  (e.g.,  Frito-Lay and  Pioneer). Vulnerability  in bargaining  positions with contractors  was
a consistent  concern  expressed by the  farmers  in this study.
2 Quasi-rents  are  usually defined  as  the nonsalvageable  value  of specific assets-that  is,  the difference  between  the first-
best  and the  second-best use  values  of those assets  (Klein, Crawford,  and  Alchian).  The importance  of quasi-rents reflects
the  sunk costs and,  thus, the  degree of asset  specificity.
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business characteristics  (e.g., risk attitudes, leverage,  and farm size), can be approximated
by his  or  her  choice  of cost-  and  risk-sharing  rates  with  contractors,  pricing  options,
contract  length, financing  arrangements,  and other contracting  terms,  as expressed  in the
following theoretical  model.3 The model represents  an extension  of Weitzman's  efficient
incentive contracts in a principal-agent framework  to include  an asset specificity variable
and related  financing  costs. The extension  yields analytical  expressions  and testable hy-
potheses  for optimal  cost- and risk-sharing  rates  and fixed  contract feesas  a function of
asset specificity,  uncertainty,  and personal and  business characteristics.
The farmer's profit function,  ir,  and  associated contracting  terms  are represented  as
(1)  rr  =  (p  +  r)Y  - aX - 3A  +  ,
where (p  +  r) is  a fixed  fee per bushel including  a market price p  and  a premium  r for
meeting  quality  specifications  and  accepting  greater production  and  investment risks;  Y
is  the contracted  crop's yield;  is the farmer's  a  share  of production costs;  X is the pro-
duction cost for meeting  the pressor's quality specifications;  is the  orfarmer's  share of
financial  costs  for the  specific  asset;  and A  is  the  annualized  financial  cost  of the  in-
vestment  in  the  specific  assets.  For  a highly  specific  asset,  A  represents  quasi-rents  be-
cause the  asset's  next-best value  would be  close to  zero.  Variable  4  is net profits  from
the  farmer's other activities.
In this framework,  the  degree of vertical  coordination  is represented  by the levels  of
the  shares  for production  costs  and financial  costs.  A cost-plus contract implies  a  =  0,
where  the  processor vertically  integrates  into agricultural  production  and bears  all pro-
duction risk.  A fixed-price  contract implies  a  =  1.0,  where  a  spot market prevails  and
the  farmer  bears  all  the production  risk. Values  of a  between  0  and  1 imply  different
degrees  of vertical  coordination  between  the  extremes  of integration  and  spot market
transactions.  Similarly, financing  specific  assets by the processor implies  83  = 0, and high
vertical  coordination.  Specific  asset  financing  by the  farmer  implies /8 =  1.0,  and  low
vertical  coordination.
The farmer's  income from other activities, 4, is essential in delineating potential moral
hazard problems characterizing  the principal-agent  relationship. This variable  is assumed
to be positively correlated with the contract production and investment costs; externalities
might  exist between  these  costs  and  the  farmer's profits  from  other  activities.  For  ex-
ample,  some  production  inputs  and  overhead costs,  as  well  as  experimentation  and  de-
velopment  costs  and  the expenses  of specific  assets dedicated  to the  contract,  might be
inflated  to  increase  the  farmer's  long-run  profits  in  other  activities.  In  this  sense,  and
considering  that monitoring  costs  are high,  the  farmer (agent)  might allow the  contract
costs to increase  (knowing the processor will cover part of the  increase) to raise profits
outside  the contract relationship.  This  situation reflects  the asymmetric  information  and
incentive aspects  of the study's  agency model.
Production  cost  uncertainty  is  represented  by different  states  of the  world  0.4  Once
set, the contractual terms cannot be renegotiated;  however, after  0 is known and the cost
3Vertical  coordination  may have  multiple dimensions.  For example,  the location  of asset control and decision making, and
the degree  of information sharing  and learning are other possible  dimensions of vertical  coordination.
4Uncertainty  in this model  reflects production  risk  and potential hold-up  and lock-in  problems  arising  from the  farmer/
processor contracting  relationship. Although production  costs are usually known  a priori for crop production, the production
cost per bushel (ex post)  depends  on external  factors  such  as weather conditions,  diseases,  insects,  and pest  infestations.
266  December 1997Farmers' Preferences  for Crop Contracts  267
uncertainty  is resolved,  the farmer will use  appropriate  "discretionary  actions"  to  max-
imize total revenues,  given the negotiated terms  (Weitzman).
The linkage  between  the farmer's  income  in  other activities  and  the ex post  contract
costs is expressed by the following  state-dependent  function g.  In  state of the world  0,  let
(2)  =  go (X,  A)
be  the farmer's  maximum attainable  net profits  in other activities,  given the values  of X
and A.  The farmer's  profit-maximizing  equilibrium  for X,  A,  and  4 in  state  0 is derived
from
(3)  max g,  (X, A)  - aX  -3A.
The first-order  conditions  with respect to decision variables  X and A  are
(4)  g  =,  = a,  and
(5)  gAo  = P
Equations  (4)  and  (5)  represent  the incentive  compatibility  constraints  in this agency
formulation.  They  illustrate  the  trade-off between  the  farmer's  incentive  efficiency  and
risk bearing.  The lower the optimal cost-sharing  rate, the higher this inefficiency because
the farmer has little incentive to reduce  and control  costs carried by the processor. How-
ever,  the risk-bearing  cost is also  lower.  Conversely,  the higher the farmer's cost shares,
the  greater  his  incentive  to  control  costs  and  thus  align  his  goals  with  those  of  the
processor.  Subject  to his  degree  of risk aversion,  the  farmer will  demand  a high  fee to
compensate  for the  greater  share  of costs  and  risks.  However,  competing  farmers  who
might bid less to receive  the contract will limit the  risk-return  trade-off.
Let  U  and  V denote  the  farmer's  and  the  processor's  utility  functions,  respectively,
where the farmer is more risk averse than the processor.  The assumption that the farmer
is  more  risk averse  than the  processor  is  needed  to  show  the  effects  of different  risk
attitudes on the contract terms and reward  structure.  The difference in risk attitudes will
affect  the  optimal  sharing  rates  through the  weighted  average  cost ratios  for X and  A,
defined below.  Higher  costs are associated  with lower income for both parties.  Thus, X,
(A0) is  positively correlated  with marginal  utilities  U'  and  V'.  No empirical  evidence  is
available  about  the  risk attitudes  of processors  relative  to  farmers  (Young).  Assuming
the farmer  is more risk averse than the processor  is plausible, however,  in specialty crop
contracting  where the processor  usually is a large agribusiness  such  as Pioneer or Frito-
Lay.  If the processor were  the  more risk averse,  his  sharing rates  would be lower or he
would demand higher fixed  fees  as  a risk premium.
The processor's  utility is  maximized when  the contracted  payments  to the farmer  are
minimized.  The  optimal  contract  maximizes  the  processor's  expected  utility  with  the
farmer's  expected  utility  fixed  at reservation  level  UO  and  with respect  to the  incentive
compatibility  constraints  [equations  (4) and  (5)]  in order to induce the  farmer to reduce
costs  and/or reach the quality specifications  at minimum cost.  The agency problem could
also  reflect  the  farmer's  point  of view.  However,  the  focus  is  on  the  processor  here,
because  he  or  she  usually  sets  the  contract  terms  and  then  offers  the  contract  to  the
farmer.
The optimal contract  ((p  +  r)*, a*,  8*) thus  solves  the following  problem:
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(6)  max Eva,3(-(p + r)Y,  - (1  - a)X,(a) - (1  - f)(A,( 0 ))}
s.t.
(7)  EU{(p  +  r)Y,  - X,(a)  - P(Ao(f3))  +  o(a, /3)}  = U 0 ,
(8)  g  = a,
and
(9)  g  = /3.
Following Weitzman,  this  principal-agent  problem is  solved analytically to derive  ex-
pressions  for the  optimal  shares  as  a function  of uncertainty,  asset  specificity,  and  risk
attitudes.  Given  the optimal  shares,  the optimal  fixed  fee is  determined  residually  from
(7).  The optimal  shares  are expressed  as  (derivations  are available  upon request):
(10)  a*  = eal(ea - 1 +  Xu/Xv),  and
(11)  13*  = e l(e/  - 1 + A,/Av),
where ea and e8 are elasticity-like measures for the responsiveness of contract production
costs  and  asset  specific  investment  costs,  respectively,  to  changes  in  the  sharing  rates.
X,  =  EXU'IEYU'  (X,  =  EXV'IEYV')  is  defined  as  weighted  average  production  cost
where  the  weights  are  the  farmer's  (processor's)  weighted marginal  utilities of income
in various  states  of the  world times their probability  of occurrence.  Similarly, AjIAv  is a
ratio of weighted  average  specific  asset costs.
Comparative  static results  can be found if additional  assumptions  are made about the
utility  and  cost  functions  and  the  probability  distribution.  The  main  results  of such  a
comparative  static  analysis  are  linked  to  the  above  average  weighted  cost ratios  XU/XV
and AUIAV.  Indeed,  higher costs are associated with lower income for both the farmer  and
processor.  X,  is  positively  correlated  with  marginal  utilities  UQ  and  V9.  Thus,  if the
farmer's  risk aversion  is increased  (relative  to the processor's),  then XJXV  is larger.  The
result would be a lower cost sharing for the farmer, given (10).  In particular, if the farmer
is  more risk averse than the processor,  this  relationship  would lead to  the condition  XU/
Xv  >1.  This result is especially  true if the farmer is risk averse and the processor  is risk
neutral  (Weitzman).  A  decrease  in  cost  uncertainty  (i.e.,  costs  less  spread  out)  would
tend to  lower Xu/Xv  and thus increase  a farmer's  cost-sharing rate.  The  same analysis is
valid for the cost,  A,  of the specific  asset.
Based on these  analytical  results and  model assumptions,  the  study's testable hypoth-
eses can be formulated,  as  in the following  section.  Furthermore,  a numerical simulation
is  followed  to  set  the  contract  options  and  terms  in  the  survey's  simulated  decision
situations.
Testable Hypotheses
The  analytical  and  comparative  static  results  derived  from  the  theoretical  framework
allow  formulations  of testable hypotheses  Hi  and H4,  while H,  and  H3 are variations  of
Williamson's transaction  cost hypotheses.  The first hypothesis  considers how asset spec-
ificity and  uncertainty  individually  affect the  degree  of vertical coordination.
268  December 1997Farmers' Preferences  for Crop Contracts  269
H1:  Under high (low) asset  specificity and production uncertainty,  the contracting  par-
ties  will prefer  a higher (lower)  degree  of vertical coordination,  in terms  of cost  and
risk  sharing.
The  second  hypothesis  considers  how  the  interaction  of asset  specificity  and  uncer-
tainty  affects  vertical coordination.
H2:  Under high (low)  asset specificity  and low (high) uncertainty,  the contracting  par-
ties prefer an intermediate  level of vertical  coordination in terms of sharing production
and  investment  costs.
The third hypothesis  considers  how  asset  specificity  affects  preferences  for financial
assistance between  the contracting  parties.
H3:  The  higher  the  required  investment  in  specific  assets,  the  greater the  preference
for financial  assistance from the processor  in order to overcome  anticipated  debt con-
straints.
The fourth  hypothesis  considers  the  relationship  between  farmer  characteristics  and
the preferred  degree of vertical  coordination.
H4:  More  risk averse  and  highly  leveraged  farmers  have  a  greater preference  for cost
and risk sharing  (i.e., greater vertical  coordination).
Data Generation
Experimental Approach
Without historical  data on the relationship of emerging  crop contracts  to transaction  and
producer  characteristics,  data  are  generated  using  a  farmer  survey  based on  simulated
contract  situations  and farmers'  preferred  choices.  The experimental  approach  has  been
widely  used  in economics,  business  management,  and  other  social sciences,  especially
when  secondary  data are  unavailable  and  when  new  issues  and  approaches  (e.g.,  food
safety,  environmental  policy,  institutional  innovation,  new  governance  structures)  are
expected  to have  greater importance  in  the future.  Examples  in economics  include  con-
tingent  valuation  techniques  in  recreation  analysis  (Boyle  and  Bishop);  elicitation  of
subjective  utility  functions  and  probability  distributions  under risk  (Anderson,  Dillon,
and  Hardaker);  elicitation  of time  attitudes  (Thaler);  valuation  of food  safety  (Eom);
investment  analysis  (Gustafson,  Barry,  and  Sonka);  and measurement  of lenders'  credit
responses  to  business  characteristics  and  management  practices  in  agriculture  (Baker;
Barry,  Baker,  and  Sanint).
The experimental approach tries to approximate  actual decision situations. Experiments
allow  for precisely controlling key  parameters of the decision  situation and thus enhance
the precision of hypotheses testing. These survey methods may be subject to arbitrariness,
potential  interviewer  bias,  lack of realism in  the  elicitation  setting, inadequate  decision
time,  and compounding  of errors in the elicitation process.  However,  analysts have com-
mitted substantial resources to refining, extending,  and generalizing the various elicitation
approaches  so that the results  will be  valid indicators  of true values.
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Producer  Survey
The farmers  who participated  in the  survey were  selected  from 77  Illinois  farmers who
were  experienced with crop contracting  and who had responded to a previous mail survey
conducted  by the  University  of Illinois  (Coaldrake  and  Sonka  1993).  Each  farmer  was
contacted by phone and invited to participate in the survey. Twenty-five farmers respond-
ed  favorably  and  were  interviewed  on  their farms  during  the  July  to  September  1994
period.5 The  power  approach  for selecting  sample  sizes  in experiments  (Neter,  Wasser-
man, and Kutner) by controlling the magnitudes of type I and type II errors was followed
to evaluate  the sample size for this experiment.  Although the sample size (25) is relatively
small,  it is  sufficiently  large  and  adequately  set to  detect  statistically  significant  differ-
ences  with  relatively  high  precision  using  the  power  approach.  Moreover,  the  experi-
mental approach uses considerable  resources  and appropriate  statistical tools, and it helps
to generate  consistent  responses  across  the participants.
The  personal  interviews  ensured  effective  communication  and  better  control  of the
experimental  setting,  although  the  higher  costs  of personal  rather  than  mail  or phone
surveys limited the number of participants.  The farmers first responded to questions about
their personal  and business  characteristics.6 The experimental  portion of the survey con-
tained a cover page and an illustration to describe the cost- and risk-sharing  arrangements,
followed by three  sets  of questions. In the first set of questions,  the farmers  ranked four
contract  options  for crop production  defined  over  four case  situations.  The contract  op-
tions  differed in terms of contract price, contract  length, and  sharing rates for production
and investment costs  (see the row  labels  in table  1).  The  case  situations  included  high
and low  levels of production  and demand  uncertainty  and asset  specificity  (see the col-
umn headings  in table  1).  High  uncertainty  was  characterized  by variable  yields  and  a
relatively  new, hybrid  crop  variety with little market experience;  low uncertainty  exhib-
ited the  opposite  characteristics.  High asset  specificity required  investing  in a  nonrede-
ployable  irrigation  system, while low asset specificity required investing in conventional
harvesting  equipment.  Consistent  with  hypothesis  H1,  the  farmers  were  anticipated  to
associate  a contract  having  greater sharing  rates and length with greater asset specificity
and uncertainty.
In the second set of questions, the farmers  were told that the processor was negotiating
production  contracts with  five other producers  and would  award contracts  to  two of the
six candidates.  Each farmer considered a range of premium bids for contract participation
with  or without cost sharing  and was  asked to  compete for the  contract by  selecting the
premium bid he would  accept.  Higher bids were  anticipated under the high asset speci-
ficity and high  uncertainty  situations.
In the third  question,  the farmers were  asked to rate their preferences  on a seven-point
scale  for each of five financial  arrangements  provided  by the processor.  Included were
assistance  with arrangement of financing  at  a local bank,  a loan  guarantee,  direct financ-
5The experiment  questionnaire  was pretested  with  two agricultural  economists,  three graduate students,  and four  farmers
who were  seed crop  experts.
6 Risk  attitudes  were  inferred from  farmers'  bids  for  playing  a heads-or-tails  lottery  game cast  in  a farm  risk  situation.
Another  proxy  for  risk  aversion  was  the  farmers'  assessment  of risk  attitude  using  a  seven-point  scale.  The proxies  were
positively correlated  with each other.
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*  1-year contract
*  0% production
cost sharing
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cost sharing
Contract B Rank
*  3-year contract
*  10%  production
cost sharinga
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Contract  C Rank
* 2-year contract
* 20%  production
cost  sharing
*  8%  investment
cost  sharing










Case  1  Case  2  Case  3  Case 4
HAS, HU  HAS, LU  LAS, HU  LAS,  LU
Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD  Mean  SD
2.80  1.32  2.84  1.24  2.08  1.15  1.84  1.10
2.32  0.98  2.28  1.06  2.48  0.87  2.56  0.87
2.44  0.65  2.2  0.64  2.28  0.84  2.24  0.87
2.44  1.38  2.68  1.34  3.16  1.31  3.36  1.00
0.90  0.06  0.86  0.08  0.50  0.05  0.46  0.07
0.59  0.06  0.62  0.08  0.28  0.04  0.28  0.08
Note:  HAS refers  to  "high  asset specificity"  and LAS  to "low asset specificity";  whereas  HU refers to
"high uncertainty"  and  LU to  "low uncertainty."
a The  cost-sharing  levels  were based  on  numerical  simulations  using  the  derived relationship  between
optimal  cost sharing  rates and fixed fees  (see Lajili).
ing,  leasing,  and  co-ownership.  Consistent  with  hypothesis  three,  processor  assistance
with  financing  was  anticipated  to  be  more  attractive  under  high  asset  specificity  and
uncertainty.
During the  interview,  short  breaks  were  taken  after  each  set of questions  to  reduce
"carry-over"  effects. Randomization in the order of the cases  was employed to eliminate
"practice"  effects.  The average  time  to  complete  the  interview  was  approximately  50
minutes.  At the end,  the farmers were asked if they had any comments  about the exper-
iment and contracting  in general.  They indicated that participation  in the experiment was
straightforward  and  readily  understandable,  and  that  the  contract  situations  clearly  re-
semble those  beginning  to emerge  in  actual  decision situations.
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Farmer Profiles
Participating  farmers  operate  large  farms  averaging  1,671  acres.  They  are  relatively
young  (43.4  years  on average),  but  also  experienced  (22  years  on  average),  and  their
experiences  with contracting  range from  6 to  15  years. They  are moderately  risk averse
and not highly  leveraged  (68% had debt to equity ratios less than  0.40). The most widely
contracted  crops  are white food-grade  corn,  seed soybeans,  and  seed corn.  The farmers
expressed  satisfaction  with  their contracting  experiences,  although  vulnerability  in bar-
gaining positions with contractors  was  a consistent concern. They also expressed interest
in a tournament compensation  scheme with rewards relative  to peer performance  (Knoe-
ber).  Higher profits  and  quality incentives  were rated as  the most important  motivations
for contracting.
Summary Statistics
Summary  results for the contract preferences  and  premium bids  are reported  in table  1.
Both sets  of responses  are  consistent  with the testable hypotheses.  Ranks of 1 and 4 are
assigned  to the most  and least preferred  contracts,  respectively.  Contracts  A and D were
most preferred  (mean ranks of 1.84 and 2.44, respectively)  under the low asset specificity/
low  uncertainty  and  the high  asset specificity/high  uncertainty  cases, respectively.  Con-
tracts B  and C (called hybrid contracts)  were  most preferred under combinations  of high
and low asset specificity  and uncertainty.  Hybrid contract  C had the lowest average mean
rank  (2.29)  and,  thus,  was  most  preferred  on average,  consistent  with  results  of other
incentive  contracting  studies.7 Premium  bids  also  are  consistent  with  the  testable  hy-
potheses  in that farmers'  mean bids were  highest and lowest under high asset specificity
and  uncertainty,  and low asset specificity  and uncertainty,  respectively.  The bids are less
variable  than the rankings of cases  and are concentrated  around the prior year's premium
given in  the survey.
Responses  to the financing alternatives  (table 2) indicate that the most preferred  option
is  "the processor  provides direct  financing"  to acquire  the required equipment,  followed
by  the  leasing  option.  In  general,  the  farmers  preferred  relatively  high  involvement  in
financing  by the processor  whether asset specificity  is high or low.
ANOVA  Analysis
Experimental Design
The survey employed a repeated-measures  experiment in which each participant responds
to  all  cases  (treatments)  in  a  randomized  order.  A  repeated-measures  design  requires
fewer  subjects,  is more  sensitive  in  detecting  treatment  effects,  has lower  experimental
error,  and  controls  effectively  for  subject  heterogeneity.  Problems  related  to  potential
changes  in the behavior of subjects  during repeated administration  of the treatment con-
7Previous  work  in agency/contracting  theory  showed  that incentive  contracts,  where  0 <a <1  and  0  </3 <1,  are Pareto
superior  to either cost-plus  or fixed-price  contracts  under general assumptions  about uncertainty and risk attitudes  (Weitzman;
Samuelson).
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Table 2.  Descriptive  Statistics and ANOVA  Results:  Financing Arrangement
Preferences
Signifi-
cance of cance  of  High Asset  Low Asset
Financing  Option  (One-Way  Specificity  Specificity
Description  ANOVA)  Mean  SD  Mean  SD
Processor  arranges financing  at a lo-
cal bank  0.62  3.12  1.92  3.28  2.07
Loan guarantees  by processor  0.08*  3.68  2.05  3.84  2.05
Processor provides  the  loan (direct
financing)  0.42  5.12  1.96  5.48  1.89
Lease equipment  from processor  0.38  4.40  1.82  4.60  1.65
Processor co-owns  equipment  with
producer  0.69  2.68  1.93  2.60  1.73
Note:  Asterisk means statistically  significant  differences  between the  high and  low asset  specificity
cases  at the  10%  level.
ditions (i.e.,  carry-over  and practice effects)  were  minimized by the random ordering  of
cases.
A two-factor repeated-measures  design is modeled  as
(12)  Yijk  =  /  +  i + a  + 
8k  +  (a 3 i)jk  +  eik,
where  ba  is a  constant,  pi  are independent  N(0,r 2);  a1 and  fi  are constants  subject  to  ,j
=  0 and  2E  =  0;  (af8)jk  are constants  subject to  2(a8)fjk =  0 for all k and  k(a/3)Jk  =  0
for  all j; Eijk  are  independent  N(0,o2)  independent  of  pi;  i  =  1, ...  n is  the number  of
participants; j  =  1,...  a denotes  the  level of asset specificity;  and k = 1,...  b denotes
the  level  of uncertainty.  In the  two-factor repeated-measures  model  (12),  it is  assumed
that  the observations  Yi  have constant variance,  constant  covariance,  and  that  any two
observations  from  different  subjects  (prior to  the random  trials)  are independent.  Also,
all observations  are assumed to be normally distributed and all the treatment observations
for a given subject  are assumed to be  independent.
The two-factor  repeated-measures  design  (where  asset  specificity and  uncertainty  are
the  factors)  characterizes  this  study's  survey because  the farmers'  responses  likely  are
affected  by their personal characteristics  as well as by the treatment conditions  (and their
interactions)  based on transaction  attributes  as hypothesized  above.  Moreover,  with four
treatment combinations  and  25  subjects,  the  observations  totaled  100.
The research hypotheses  are tested using the experiment  data and the repeated analysis
of variance  (ANOVA)  procedures.  Multiple  linear and logistic  regressions  are also used
to  test  the  link between  farmer  characteristics  and  transaction  attributes  in  explaining
contract  preferences.  ANOVA  techniques  are widely used in experiment  response  anal-
ysis to test single and interaction treatment effects based on factor level-mean differences,
if the model assumptions  are satisfied (Keppel;  Neter, Wasserman,  and Kutner).  Because
the experiment  data (especially  the rankings)  may violate normality,  nonparametric  tests
also are  conducted.
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Table 3.  Significance  of Asset  Specificity  and Uncertainty in Contract Rankings
Signifi-
cance
Dependent  Variable  Source  of Variation  of F
Contract  A
*  1-year contract  Asset  specificity  0.002**
* 0%  PCS  Uncertainty  0.579
* 0%  ICS  Asset specificity by uncertainty interaction  0.258
Contract  B
*  3-year contract  Asset  specificity  0.331
*  10%  PCS  Uncertainty  0.882
*  16%  ICS  Asset specificity by uncertainty interaction  0.743
Contract  C
* 2-year contract  Asset  specificity  0.772
* 20%  PCS  Uncertainty  0.295
* 8% ICS  Asset specificity by uncertainty interaction  0.495
Contract  D
* 5-year contract  Asset  specificity  0.009**
* 30%  PCS  Uncertainty  0.278
* 23%  ICS  Asset specificity by uncertainty interaction  0.919
Note:  Double  asterisks mean  significant  at the 5% level.
Contract  Type
Table  3  reports  the  univariate  ANOVA  results  for  the  contract  rankings.  A univariate
analysis  considers each  contract response  as a separate dependent variable; a multivariate
approach  considers  the contract  type  as  an additional within-subjects  variable  similar to
the  asset specificity  and uncertainty  variables.
The  univariate  ANOVA  results  indicate  that  asset  specificity  is  significant  at the  5%
level  for extreme  case  contracts  A and  D;  however,  neither  asset  specificity nor uncer-
tainty  are  significant for the  hybrid  contracts  B  and  C.  The insignificance  of the inter-
actions  effects  is consistent  with  previous  transaction  cost economics  work  (Anderson
and Schmittlein).  The multivariate  results  (not reported here;  see  Lajili) further  confirm
the dominant effect of asset specificity on the farmers'  contracting preferences.  The asset
specificity  and contract  "main effects"  are significant,  as  well  as  their interaction.  This
result implies that contract preferences  differ for each asset specificity level. The direction
of asset specificity  significance  is consistent  with  hypothesis  H1;  the farmers  shift their
preferences  from  contract  A  to  contract  D  as  asset  specificity  increases.  The  nonpara-
metric  results are consistent  with the ANOVA  results (Lajili).  Thus,  the transaction  cost
hypotheses  are  supported.
Premium Bids
The  premium  bids  reflect  the  farmers'  preferences  between  a reference  contract  with  no
cost-sharing  by  the processor  and a cost-sharing  contract.  Only  the multivariate  results for
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Treatment Effect  Bids  Bids
--------------  (p-value) -----------------
Asset specificity  0.000**  0.109
Uncertainty  0.829  0.000**
Cost sharing  0.000**  0.708
Asset specificity by  uncertainty interac-
tion  0.258  0.006**
Asset specificity by cost-sharing  inter-
action  0.000**  0.255
Uncertainty  by  cost-sharing  interaction  0.000**  0.001**
Asset  specificity by  uncertainty by cost-
sharing  interaction  0.094*  0.125
Note:  Double  and  single  asterisks  mean  significant  at  the  5% and
10%  levels, respectively.
absolute  and relative  bids  are  reported  in  table  4.8 Absolute  premium  bids  are  the actual
bids, while relative bids are deviations between  actual bids and last year's reference premium.
Farmer  bids  and  thus  the  implicit  choice  between  these  contracts  are  significantly
influenced  by asset  specificity  and  uncertainty,  consistent  with the  testable  hypotheses.
Moreover,  in  contrast  with the  contract choice  results,  the effects  on the premium  bids
of uncertainty and the interaction between asset specificity and uncertainty are significant.
This consistency  with hypothesis H2 suggests  that the interaction  between the two trans-
action cost variables  significantly influences  the  various  contracting  terms.
The observed  differences  between  the  ANOVA  results  for the  absolute  and  relative
premium bids also reflect a reversal in the significance of asset specificity and uncertainty.
The farmers'  absolute bids are significantly affected by asset specificity while the relative
bids depend more on uncertainty.  This  contrast could reflect  ambiguity  and anchoring  in
decision  making  where  individuals  rely  more  heavily  on  anchor  points  when  decision
situations  are  ambiguous  (Kahneman,  Slovic, and  Tversky).
Financing  Arrangements
The  one-way  ANOVA  results  for  financing  preferences  were  shown  in  table  2.  Asset
specificity  is  not  significant  for most  of the  financing  arrangements  (further  supported
by  the  multivariate  and  nonparametric  results).  The  farmers  may  have  considered  the
required  equipment investment  as another contract risk and thus preferred relatively high
financial assistance  from the processor,  regardless  of the asset specificity level.  Only the
most preferred  option  (processor  provides  direct  financing)  was  significant  at the  10%
level.  These results  could imply  the  role of financial  hostages  and  risk sharing  needed
8 The univariate  and multivariate  ANOVA results  are consistent.
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to reduce  agency costs and foster a stable contractual relationship  (Jensen and Meckling).
When  both  parties  are  required  to  invest  in  the  specific  asset,  the  adverse  selection
problems  are  reduced  since  this  investment  share  requirement  will  act  as  an  ex  ante
screening  tool to differentiate  among potential  agents.  In addition,  the financial  hostage
(equipment)  acts  as  a bond whose  costs  are born by both contracting  parties  to increase
their cooperation  and  commitment,  especially if long-term relationships  are  sought.
Regression  Analysis
Regression  analysis is used to determine the relationship between the farmers'  contracting
preferences  and their personal and business characteristics  (farm size, leverage,  age, risk
attitude).  Logistic  regression  is  used for  the  rank  measures  and  ordinary  least  squares
(OLS)  is used for the premium bid and financing preferences. The rankings were recorded
as  binary  variables  by  assigning  a rank of one  to  the  farmers'  preferred  contract.  The
logistic  results  for  contracts  A  through  D are  reported  in  table  5.  Contracts  A  and  B
experience  better fit than C and  D in  terms of the log-likelihood  and model chi-squared
statistic.  The  chi-squared  statistic  is  significant  at  10%  for  contract  A  and  at  5%  for
contract B.  In particular,  the  asset  specificity  variable  is  significant  at the 5%  level for
both A and B. Higher asset specificity significantly decreases  the likelihood of preferring
contract  A  and  increases  the  likelihood  of preferring  contract  B,  as  predicted  by  the
theory and  consistent with  the ANOVA  results.9
Although not  statistically  significant,  the results  for contracts  C  and D are  consistent
with the anticipated relationships;  greater asset specificity decreases  the odds of choosing
the hybrid contract C, while increasing the odds of preferring contract D with the greatest
risk  sharing  and  duration.  Among  the  farm  characteristics,  only  the  leverage  variable
significantly influences  contract preferences in the case of contract B. A one-unit increase
in leverage  significantly increases the odds of choosing contract B  by a factor of 13,585,
while it decreases  the odds of choosing contract  A by a factor of 0.05.  Similarly, greater
leverage  increases the  odds of choosing C and decreases  the odds of choosing D. These
results imply that highly leveraged  farmers  are more likely to prefer hybrid contracts  B and
C,  with some  risk sharing  and  average duration, over  the extreme  alternatives  A and  D.
The  overall  prediction  accuracy  rates  indicate  the  logistic  model's  performance  in
predicting  group  membership  based  on  the  selected  covariates  in  the  model  and  the
estimated probabilities. This approach is especially useful for grouping respondents based
on the personal  characteristics  and the  contract or transaction  attributes.  The prediction
accuracy  rates  for each  contract regression  are relatively high  (78.3%  for A and  91.3%
for B), implying  that the  personal information  and  contract  attributes  help considerably
to  explain  contract preferences.  Moreover,  the  farmers'  postexperiment  comments  indi-
cated  that  the  contract-menu  approach  followed  in  the  experiment  would  offer  greater
flexibility in  contract analysis  and  enhance their bargaining  power.
The  OLS  results for the  premium bids  with  and without  cost sharing  are reported  in
table  6.  The  asset  specificity  and  risk  variables  are  significant  at the  5%  level  when
absolute bids are regressed on farmer and contract characteristics.  The relative bids also
9The  exp  (B)  column in table  5 represents  the change  in  the  odds of preferring  the contract  of interest  following  a unit
change  in  the corresponding  independent  variable.  The  odds of an event  are  the ratio of probability  of that event  occurring
to  the probability  that  it will  not occur. For  example,  an increase  in asset  specificity  decreases the  odds of preferring  A  by
a factor  of 0.26, while it increases  the odds  of preferring B  by a factor of 40.93.
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Contract  Contract  Contract  Contract
A  B  C  D
-2  Log-likelihood
Good of fit
Overall prediction  accuracy
16.99  15.67  12.61  12.02
15.45  49.06  10.79  9.86
78.26%  91.30%  86.96%  82.61%
Chi- Signif-
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Table 6.  Multiple  Regression  Results for Absolute  and Relative  Premium Bids
Estimated  Significance  of
Coefficient  t-Statistic
Cost  Absolute  Relative  Absolute  Relative
Variable  Sharing  Bids  Bids  Bids  Bids
Asset  specificity  Without  0.38  0.02  0.00**  0.34
With  0.34  0.05  0.00**  0.11
Uncertainty  Without  0.03  -0.04  0.4  0.17
With  -0.06  -0.10  0.07*  0.004**
Size  Without  0.00  0.00  0.64  0.19
With  0.00  0.00  0.17  0.09*
Leverage  Without  -0.006  -0.03  0.93  0.64
With  -0.001  -0.01  0.98  0.81
Lottery  (risk aversion)  Without  -0.016  -0.01  0.019**  0.01**
With  -0.018  -0.01  0.01**  0.01**
Age  Without  -0.002  -0.001  0.22  0.28
With  -0.001  0.00  -0.57  0.79
Constant  Without  0.63  0.17  0.00**  0..08*
With  0.37  0.11  0.00**  0.32
Without  With
F-statistic  34.33  (2.21)  24.43  (3.52)
Significance  of F  0.00**  (0.09*)  0.00**  (0.02**)
R2 0.93  (0.46)  0.09  (0.56)
Sample Size  N = 22  N = 23
Note:  The  numbers in parentheses  represent  the  relative bid statistics  results.
indicate  a significant risk attitude effect.  Higher risk aversion  is associated with a  lower
deviation  between  the  actual  bid  and  the  reference  premium,  perhaps  reflecting  an  an-
choring effect  as well.  Only the uncertainty  variable is  significant and negatively  related
to  the  relative  bids;  the higher  is  uncertainty,  the  greater  the reliance  on the  reference
premium,  consistent  with the ANOVA results.
OLS results for the financing preferences (table 7) are also consistent with the ANOVA
results  relative  to  the  nonsignificance  of asset  specificity.  An  exception  is  the  positive
and  significant relationship  between  asset  specificity  and  co-ownership.  Among  farmer
characteristics,  leverage  is positively  and  significantly related  to  preferences  in  three  of
the  five financing  options:  processor  arranges  financing,  guarantees  loans,  and  co-owns
the  equipment.  This  result  could imply  farmers'  perceptions  of credit  rationing  due  to
high  risks.  Finally,  as  farm  size  increases,  the lease  option was  preferred  less than the
other  financing arrangements.
Concluding  Comments
The market-oriented  1996 farm bill may  encourage  greater use of contract  crop produc-
tion.  This  article  used  simulated  decision  and  preference-ordering  techniques  within  a
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Table  7.  Regression  Results for Financing Preferences
Financ-  Estimated  Signif-
ing  Coeffi-  icance
Variable  Option  cient  of t
Asset  specificity  F1  0.69  0.38
F2  0.46  0.57
F3  0.05  0.95
F4  0.95  0.23
F5  1.67  0.02**
Size  Fl  0.00  0.43
F2  0.00  0.56
F3  0.00  0.29
F4  -0.001  0.02**
F5  0.00  0.47
Leverage  Fl  5.35  0.00**
F2  5.71  0.00**
F3  0.59  0.77
F4  -0.05  0.97
F5  3.48  0.04**
Lottery  (risk aversion)  Fl  -0.13  0.42
F2  -0.006  0.96
F3  0.28  0.13
F4  0.04  0.79
F5  0.05  0.72
Age  Fl  -0.07  0.12
F2  -0.08  0.12
F3  0.01  0.85
F4  0.008  0.85
F5  -0.005  0.89
Note:  Fl:  "Processor arranges  financing  at a local  bank"
F2:  "Processor  provides  loan guarantees"
F3:  "Processor provides  direct financing"
F4:  "Processor provides  a lease option"
F5:  "Processor co-owns  equipment  with the producer"
principal-agent  and  transaction  cost framework  to  determine  crop  farmers'  preferences
for new vertical  coordination  alternatives.  The statistical  results  support the testable hy-
potheses  about  the  anticipated  relationships  between  contract  choice,  pricing behavior,
financing  arrangements,  asset specificity,  and uncertainty.  The degree  of asset specificity
significantly influences  farmers'  choices of contractual  arrangements, whereas uncertainty
and  the  interaction  between  asset  specificity  and  uncertainty  play  a  significant  role  in
pricing behavior  and  the  choice  of hybrid  contracts.  Among  the  farmer characteristics,
risk  aversion  and  leverage  significantly  affect  bidding  behavior  and  financing  choice,
respectively.  The results  also confirm  the need  to jointly consider  transaction  attributes
and  personal  and  business  characteristics  to  explain  vertical  coordination  decisions.
Moreover,  the commitment  and  bonding effects  arising from required equipment  invest-
ments  are plausible  explanations  for the  observed  financing  preferences.
[Received August 1996; final revision received June 1997.]
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